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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
passes by children and the dangerous propensities of his instru-
mentality.
From the plaintiff's viewpoint, the adoption of the restate-
ment position will greatly facilitate the recovery of damages in
cases where all the dictates of human decency require that dam-
ages be awarded. Lawyers will no longer be hampered by the
necessity of proving that an instrumentality was so especially
and unusually attractive to children as to constitute an implied
invitation to them, nor will they be confronted with the often im-
possible task of proving that the dangerous instrumentality was
the thing that actually lured the child onto the land in the first
place. From the landowner 's standpoint, the restatement posi-
tion will cast upon him somewhat greater burdens in that he will
have to make more effort to inform himself as to whether children
will be likely to trespass, and whether they will be apt to discover
the dangerous condition after they get on the land; he will also
have to take into consideration ways and means of protecting such
children from injury which is unreasonably threatened by dan-
gerous instrumentalities which perchance they may not discover
before trespassing.
To sum up, adoption of the restatement view on attractive
nuisance should promote a much more equitable disposition of
the cases than has heretofore been had in Montana.
ROBERT W. MAXWELL
PRENATAL INJURY: RECOVERY OR ANOMALY?
En ventre sa mere is a term descriptive of an unborn child.
According to Black's Law Dictionary,1 for some purposes the law
regards an infant en ventre as in being. The examples given
are: it may take a legacy, have a guardian, and an estate may
be limited to its use. The common law, while it recognized and
protected the rights and interests of an unborn child in some re-
spects; flatly denied them in others, most obviously where a tort
was concerned. The rationale most relied upon seemed to be
that an unborn child was but a part of the mother, and had no
existence or being which could be subject to injury. This view in
the field of torts was flatly contradictory of recognition given
the rights of an infant en ventre sa mere in other branches of the
law.
1BLAcx's LAW DIrIONARY (4th ed. 1951) p. 619.
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Blackstone, after declaring the right of personal security to
be an absolute right, said:
"The right of personal security consists in a per-
son's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his
limbs, his body, his health . . . Life is a right inherent
by nature in every individual; and it begins, in con-
templation of law, as soon as an infant is able to stir in
the mother's womb. "'
It is common knowledge today that such an argument, deny-
ing the existence or life of an unborn child, is fallacious. Medical
science has proven that an infant en ventre sa mere is not merely
part of its mother, for it can be separated from her through mis-
chance, artificially, or in cases where the mother dies, as early as
six months in its development, and remain alive as an individual.
When an unborn child is harmed, and it dies, or it lives and
carries the crippling marks of the injury throughout its life, is
it reasonable to say that the only damage has been to the mother?
It will be the purpose of this article to point out the many
ways in which the common law protected the rights of infants en
ventre sa mere, to show that there is no reasonable basis for deny-
ing those rights where a tort is concerned, and to trace the recent
trend in the statutes and the cases away from such a contradic-
tory distinction.
The law has consistently recognized and protected the in-
terests of unborn children in the field of trusts. A covenant to
stand seised to the use of an unborn relative was valid at the
common law.'
Folk v. Hughes' upheld the interests of beneficiaries who
were as yet unborn at the creation of a trust in their favor.
One of the leading cases on this point is Morsman v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Avenue.! The opinion explains the rule that a
present trust may be created where the beneficiary is an unborn
child. The child cannot take an immediate interest; but the ex-
press trust springs up when he is born. As was pointed out in
Folk v. Hughes, such a beneficiary can enforce his right. This
clearly recognizes and protects the child's interest while en ventre
sa mere.
2Quoted from dissenting opinion in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184
Ill. 359, 75 Am. St. Rep. 176, 48 L.R.A. 275, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
3GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, § 62.
'100 S. Car. 220, 84 S.E. 713 (1915).
690 F(2d 18, 113 A.L.R. 441 (C.C. 8th, 1937) cert. denied 302 U.S. 701,
58 S.Ct. 20, 82 L.Ed. 542 (1937).
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The Restatement of Trusts" approves the rule that an unborn
child can be the beneficiary of a trust.
The same rights are recognized and protected in the case of
Hills v. Travelers Bank & T. Co.' The Court held there that
neither the presence of the attorney general of the state nor the
parents of unborn children as parties to the suit for termination
of a trust would afford adequate representation for unborn chil-
dren so as to make a decree binding upon them.
Both at common law and under statutes, posthumous children
may inherit under the laws of intestate succession, as heirs and
distributees. In Barnett v. Pinkston,8 the Alabama Court states
the well-supported proposition that children en ventre sa mere
shall be considered in esse for most purposes of property; holding
that a child born two months after the death of the father was
regarded in law as a 'living child' at the death of the father,
and took a vested remainder.
In Montana, Section 91-417 of the Revised Codes,' relating
to inheritance by right of representation, states that posthumous
children are considered as living at the death of their parents.
Under this statute, the case of Haydon v. Normandin' holds that
a child unborn at the time of the death of the father is deemed to
have been then living, and enjoys all the rights of inheritance
conferred upon a living person.
Another section of the Montana code" protects the interest of
a child en ventre sa mere even further, by providing that when a
testator has a child born after making of his will, either in his
lifetime or after his death, and leaves the child unmentioned and
unprovided for, the child takes as if on intestacy. This is a com-
mon statutory provision. Numerous cases from other states are
cited in Corpus Juris Secundum.'
Under the law of wills, it is well established that a testator
may provide for children yet unborn, and their rights will be
protected. This rule has been extended in many states, by
statute, to include class dispositions. For example, a Montana
statute provides that a child en ventre sa mere at the testator's
'I RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS, § 112.
'Hills v. Travelers Bank & T. Co., 125 Conn. 640, 7 A (2d) 652, 123 A.L.R.
1419 (1939).8Barnett v. Pinkston, 238 Ala. 327, 191 So. 371 (1939).0R.C.M. 1947, § 91-417.
155 Mont. 539, 179 P. 460 (1919).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 91-135.
"26 C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 45.
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death, or at any period when a disposition to a class vests in right
or possession, takes if within the description of the class. '
A quotation from Lord Coke will best illustrate the position
of the common law in the criminal field:
"If a woman be quick with child and by a potion or
otherwise killeth it in her womb; or if a man beat her,
whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is delivered
of a dead child, this is a great misprision, and no mur-
der; but if the child be born alive, and dieth of the
potion, battery or other cause, this is murder. '. ..
If life begins in the contemplation of the common law as
soon as the infant stirs en ventre sa mere (Blackstone's state-
ment supra), and the law at that time recognized the infant's
right of personal security, to the extent that if it died of prior
injuries after it was born, it was murder as to the wrongdoer;
then it is difficult to see why the law should not equally protect
the infant's right of personal security as to every injury while
en ventre sa mere. It has been recognized that this distinction
is not a compelling one, and legislatures in a good many states
have provided appropriate penalties for the killing of an unborn
child, under penal enactments. A few cases under such statutes
will be cited by way of example. In Dawsan v. State' the Su-
preme Court of Arkansas affirmed a conviction of manslaughter
in the killing of an unborn child.
State v. Bassett" is a New Mexico decision where the defend-
ant was granted a new trial, on evidentiary grounds, after con-
vietion of murder in the second degree. He was convicted of
killing an unborn child by abortion, under a statute making the
death of either the child or the mother murder in the second de-
gree. A similar statute, cited in People v. Stahl," provides that
such killing shall constitute the crime of manslaughter.
If an unborn child is to be recognized as an individual, so
that his life is protected separately from that of his mother, is
there any sound reason to flatly deny him any remedy for a tort ?
The great majority of decisions, until recently at least,
denied recovery in tort for prenatal injuries. To better under-
stand the problem, it would be profitable to examine some of
these holdings. One of the earliest cases, and one most relied on
-R.C.M. 1947, § 91-223.
"MIKELL, CRIMINAL LAw (3rd ed. 1933) p. 143.
Accord: Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671, 67 Am. St. Rep. 157
(1898) ; Shedd v. State, 178 Ga. 653, 173 S. E. 847 (1934).
1121 Ark. 211, 180 S.W. 761 (1915).
1626 N. Mex. 476, 194 P. 867 (1921).
"234 Mich. 569, 208 N.W. 685 (1926).
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in denying recovery, is Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton.'
There, the mother fell because of a defect in the highway. She
was between four and five months advanced in pregnancy, and
the child did not survive its premature birth. The Court ruled
that an action by an administrator for the child could not be
maintained. The opinion relies on lack of precedent, stating in
part:
"No case, so far as we know, has ever decided that,
if the infant survived, it could maintain an action for
injuries received by it while in its mother's womb."
The Court further states that as the child was a part of its
mother at the time of the injury, any damage not too remote was
recoverable by her. In this connection it should be noted that the
infant was not viable, that is, not so far advanced that it could
live independently when separated by such an accident. The
Court suggests ,that if there were a tort liability in such a case,
the question would be whether an infant, not yet viable, would
be a person with legal standing to be represented by an adminis-
trator. This question is not completely answered in the case.
A very recent Massachusetts decision, Bliss v. Passanesi,'
denies recovery by the administrator of a deceased child for death
from injuries sustained while en ventre sa mere, and for con-
scious suffering before death. The facts differed from the Diet-
rich case, in that here the infant was viable. The opinion dis-
cusses recent cases that have allowed recovery in similar circum-
stances, and concedes the strength of the grounds advanced, but
also gives weight to an argument that has been presented to the
contrary, that is the difficulty of reliable proof. The most
significant statement, however, is this:
"We do not intimate what our decision would be if
the question were presented for the first time . . . We
are not inclined to overrule the Dietrich case."
it is interesting that the court, in relying heavily on the
principle of stare decisis, made no mention of the obvious differ-
ence in the two cases; the viability of the child in the Bliss case.
Some courts have hinged recovery on this very distinction, as
will be seen later.'
Recent specific legislation in Massachusetts has recognized
the rights of infants en ventre sa mere. A 1950 amendment to
"8138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
...... Mass...... 95 N.E. (2d) 206 (1950).
'Infra note 33.
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the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act' defines chil-
dren as including "any children of the injured employee con-
ceived but not born at the time of the employee's injury. .. "
An Illinois case denying an action for injuries received be-
fore birth, and used widely as a precedent, is that of Allaire v.
St. Luke's Hospital.' There the child's mother entered a hospital
for maternity confinement, and was seriously injured while being
taken up on a defective elevator. The child was injured in the
accident, and although born alive a few days later, and about
ten years old at the time of suit, was permanently and seriously
crippled. The Court held that the infant, suing through his next
friend, could not maintain an action. The opinion adopts the
view that a child en ventre sa mere is but a part of the mother,
and characterizes recognition of the unborn child in other
branches of law as a legal fiction that should not be applied to
negligent injury, citing the Dietrich case as authority. The dis-
senting opinion of Boggs, J. has been widely quoted by pro-
ponents of recovery, for its convincing reasoning. Boggs answers
the lack of precedent:
"An adjudicated case is not indispensable to estab-
lish a right to recover under the rules of the common
law . . . New and peculiar cases must arise from time to
time ... these may either be referred to some principle
previously declared, or to some one which now, for the
first time, there is occasion to apply . . . The common
law, by way of damages, gave redress for personal in-
juries inflicted by the wrong or neglect of another. The
case disclosed by the declaration under consideration is
embraced within the limits of the principle thus recog-
nized, and it is clear recovery could have been main-
tained at common law unless the fact that plaintiff was
unborn when the alleged injuries were inflicted would
have operated to deny a right of action."
He goes on to point out that science has conclusively proven
that a viable child, capable of separate existence, is not merely a
part of the mother; and as in this case where it goes on to live in
a crippled condition it is but natural justice that it should be
allowed an action for its injuries just as any other person. Boggs
reasons that the Dietrich case has no application, since there the
child was not viable, and the Court did not state outright that
they intended the holding to cover that situation. Many text
writers have endorsed Boggs' statement of what the law should
be; that when an unborn child is viable, and injured en ventre sa
"Laws of Massachusetts C. 152, § 32 (c) & (d), § 35 A.
184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638, 48 L.R.A. 225, 75 Am. St. Rep. 176 (1900).
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mere, that it has a right of action for such injuries as are evident
and can be proved after its birth.
In Buel v. United Rys. Co.' the Missouri Court ruled that a
wrongful death statute could not have been intended to provide
recovery for the death of a person after birth, caused by negligent
injuries before birth; since there was no precedent at common
law allowing recovery for injuries received while en ventre sa
mere. The Dietrich and Allaire cases were cited, and the Court
said "it is not necessary to rule upon the rationale of these deci-
sions. "
In Drobner v. Peters" the New York Court ruled that an
action by an infant for prenatal injury may not be maintained
at the common law. Cardozo, J. dissented. The majority opinion
enumerates the instances in which an unborn child is protected
by the law, in addition to those above stating that a female under
sentence of death may not be executed if she is quick with child.
But they decided the analogies were not controlling, and hesi-
tated to establish a principle of liability against precedent. This
Court also cited the Dietrich and Allaire cases.
Stanford v. St. Loids-San Francisco Ry. Co.,' in stating
that the authorities are unanimous in holding that a prenatal
injury affords no basis for an action in damages, cites the cases
that we have examined above. The opinion further states that:
"It may be that in a few instances hard cases may
arise wherein a child may be burdened through life with
an affliction produced before its birth, while, on the
other hand, many cases might arise, should the rule be
different, where the recovery would be based upon the
merest conjecture or speculation as to whether or not the
prenatal injury was the cause of the death or condition
of the child."
It is the opinion of this writer that difficulty of proof should
not be a valid reason for laying down a flat rule of law denying
recovery under any and all circumstances. This is actually a
question of evidence, and not one of tort. It would be far better
to allow the injured plaintiff to present his case for what it is
worth, subject to all the safeguards that have grown up in the
evidentiary field, and under appropriate instructions from the
court regarding the legal weight of such evidence. Actual injury
is surely capable of clear medical proof, in view of the advanced
state of medical science today. It is entirely practical to allow
'248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71, 45 L.R.A.N.S. 625 (1913).
"232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567, 20 A.L.R. 1503 (1921).
25214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566, 25 N.C.A.A. 874 (1926).
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recovery only on such clear proof, and deny it where the claim is
not proved. Under such circumstances, the possibility that specu-
lative or fraudulent claims will possibly be made should not
operate to deny recovery altogether, but the problem is simply
one of adequate proof. This would work no hardship on the
defendant, since under present procedure his experts will be al-
lowed to examine the plaintiff, if living; and if not, then the
same evidence will be available to him, substantially, as is avail-
able to the plaintiff's representative.
A very applicable analogy might be drawn here to tort re-
covery for mental pain and suffering. Although there has been
a good deal of controversy on this point, the clear tendency of the
courts today is to allow such recovery. One of the chief grounds
of denial has been difficulty of proof, and this has been largely
overcome by recognizing it as a question of the law of evidence,
and allowing recovery in a proper case, after the evidentiary safe-
guards have been applied. This development is discussed in
Prosser On Torts." Mental pain and suffering offer a much
greater chance for false or conjectural claims than do prenatal
injuries, for the latter are physical injuries and capable of phy-
sical proof.
A Texas case,' decided in 1935, based its denial of damages
for death of a child from prenatal injuries upon its wrongful
death statute, which provided that the wrongful act must be such
that, if death had not resulted, the injured party would have had
an action for the injury himself. The Court went on to say that
it had found no decision allowing recovery for prenatal injury,
either to the child if it lived, or to the beneficiaries if it died.
Recent cases, which will be discussed, have supported the proposi-
tion that there is sound basis for such recovery.
The very recent case of Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co.' was de-
cided under a similar wrongful death statute. There the Michi-
gan Court held that a child born dead has no action at common
law for injuries before birth; consequently no action survives to
the representative under the statute. The Court said:
"We adhere to the rule that an unborn child is a
part of the mother until birth, and as such, has no
juridical existence. There are cases holding that a child
born alive' may maintain an action for prenatal in-
UPROSSER, TORTS (1941) § 34, p. 210-213.
'Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. (2d)
944, 97 A.L.R. 1513 (1935).
...... Nebr ........ 50 N.W. (2d) 229 (1951).
3 My own italics.
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juries ... This question, however, is not before us and
we leave it for determination if and when it arises."
The Restatement of Torts' states:
"A person who negligently causes harm to an un-
born child is not liable to such child for the harm." The
caveat to this section: "The Institute takes no position
upon the question whether there is liability to a child
hurt while unborn by a person who intentionally or reck-
lessly and without excuse harms the mother or child."
This section is cited in Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co.,m a recent
case denying recovery for injuries sustained while en ventre sa
mere. Again, in Stemmer v. Kline, the Court denies recovery
for such injuries, even though the child was born alive and still
living in a crippled condition. The opinion says, in part:
"We therefore willingly subscribe to the rule for-
mulated in Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 4,
paragraph 869 ... it follows that the judgment in favor
of the plaintiff must be reversed."
Upon reading the applicable section of the Restatement,
and the Caveat, the obvious question that comes to mind is: why
the distinction? Perhaps the Institute felt that there was no
duty of care in the negligent injury. In answer to such argu-
ment, it should be sufficient to point out that common knowledge
tells us a great many females are or may be in the enceinte con-
dition, and that injury to them will likely result in or include
injury to the infant. Further, in a good many of the cases ex-
amined, the pregnancy was so far advanced as to be obvious, or
involved treatment by a physician for that very reason. In any
event, in view of recent cases allowing recovery (which will be
cited infra), and the great amount of legal writing favoring such
view, should not the Institute's rule be re-examined?
Without discussing further cases in detail, it will be seen
that the usual reasons for denying recovery are lack of precedent;
stare decisis; difficulty of proof with the possibility of claims
based on conjecture; identity of the child with the mother and no
separate being; and absence of statute providing for such re-
covery. These have all been discussed here to some extent, but
the case of Stemmer v. Kline supra offers further illustration.
There the defendant physician diagnosed the infant's mother as
suffering from a tumor, and gave X-ray treatments over a period
'*IV RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 869, p. 404.
'1339 Pa. 547, 16 A(2d) 28 (1940).
128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A (2d) 489 (1942).
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of time. The patient was actually pregnant, which available tests
would have shown, but for defendant's negligence in not applying
them. The plaintiff was born an idiot, without power to walk,
talk, or see. The jury found these injuries to be the direct result
of the negligent treatment, their finding supported by competent
evidence. In such a case, should the Court feel strictly bound by
stare decisis and lack of precedent for recovery, without a search-
ing inquiry into the merits of the action and the great injustice
of its decision? It is submitted that the six Justices who dis-
agreed with the majority on the point involved herein took the
better view of the function of the law. Where fundamental jus-
tice can only be done by allowing recovery, and that can be ac-
complished by applying established principles in a logical fashion,
then the courts should not feel that they are foreclosed by the
lack of precedent on the particular facts.
Before turning to a consideration of the recent cases allow-
ing recovery, it might be worthwhile to examine Lipps v. Mil-
waukee Electric Ry. & Light Co.,' a Wisconsin case. There, in
denying recovery for injuries suffered while en ventre sa mere,
at about five months development, the Court said:
"We go no further than the facts of the case re-
quire, and hold that no cause of action accrues to an
infant en ventre sa mere for injuries received before it
could be born viable. Very cogent reasons may be urged
for a contrary rule where the infant is viable . . . As to
such cases we express no opinion."
In view of such a decision, confined strictly to the facts in-
volved, one wonders whether the Dietrich case has not been cited
for more than was intended in that holding. In a great majority
of cases examined, the Dietrich case was cited for the rule that
there simply is no such cause of action at the common law, and
many of the subsequent cases so citing it have been altogether
different in their factual situations.
The Court in the Lipps case disposes of the analogy between
other branches of the law in recognizing infants en ventre sa
mere, together with medical recognition of the separate entity, in
these words:
"The law cannot always be scientific or technically
correct. It must often content itself -with being merely
practical."
It is the contention of this article that in allowing recovery,
'164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
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the law would be both technically correct and overwhelmingly
practical.
The case of Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, although a
Canadian decision, is of interest on the problem. There the Court
held that an infant who was injured while en ventre sa mere,
through the negligence of another, and survived, could recover
for such injuries. To the contention that an unborn child was
but part of the mother, without separate existence, the opinion
answered that under the civil law, a conceived but unborn child
is regarded as already existing for all purposes to its benefit.
Citing early common law acceptance of this proposition in the
law of Wills, the Court suggests that those judges considered the
rule to be of general application. In regard to the criminal
field, the opinion says:
"If the law recognizes the separate existence of the
unborn child sufficiently to punish the crime, it is diffi-
cult to see why it should not also recognize its separate
existence for the purpose of redressing the tort. .. ."
Holding the civil law rule to be of general application, and
the unborn infant an existing person in the eyes of the law at the
time of the injury, recovery was allowed.
The case of Cooper v. Blanck,' decided under the civil law of
Louisiana, awarded damages to the parents of a child who died
three days after birth from prenatal injuries, both for the death
of the child and for the child's suffering. The Court interpreted
a wrongful death statute as including infants en ventre sa mere,
holding that another statute, declaring that children in the
mother's womb are considered as already born, is sweeping and
not restricted to property rights in succession. On the question
of damages, the Court said:
"Mere difficulty in assessing damages resulting
from a wrongful act does not prevent an award."
In 1946, the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia sustained an action for prenatal injuries in the ab-
sence of statute creating such a right.' The child was injured
through malpractice while in the process of removal from its
mother's womb, and demonstrated its viability by surviving. The
Court discusses the Dietrich decision at some length, but does not
find it controlling, especially in view of the fact that the infant
"1933 Can. S. Ct. 456, 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933).
'39 So. (2d) 352 (1923).MBonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. 1946).
11
Benson: Prenatal Injury: Recovery or Anomaly?
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1953
NOTES AND COMMENT
there was nonviable. The opinion answers the absence of prece-
dent in these words:
"The absence of precedent should afford no refuge
to those who by their wrongful act, if such be proved,
have invaded the right of an individual .... What right
is more inherent, and more sacrosanct, than that of the.
individual in his possession and enjoyment of his life,
his limbs and his body?"
In the case of Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons Inc.,
the Georgia Court held that an infant could maintain an action
for prenatal injuries, suffered through the negligent driving of
an ambulance in which his mother was a passenger. The opinion
says that it would be illogical, unrealistic, and unjust for the law
to withhold processes to protect the person of an unborn child,
while at the same time protecting his property rights. In the
Court's decision it is said:
"... We are satisfied that, without any legislative
action, courts of Georgia have the authority now, based
upon the common law, to grant such relief. .... "
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch held that a child who was injured
while en ventre sa mere, and born prematurely and blind because
of the accident, was entitled to recover for the injury if it were
shown to be negligent. The Maryland Court discusses the author-
ity on this subject exhaustively, coming to the conclusion that
recovery is justified, and that this view is fully supported by
modern medical knowledge and by recent cases, "We are deter-
mining now what the common law of Maryland always has been."
The most recent case on this point is Woods v. Lancet,' hold-
ing that an unborn child injured while viable, is entitled to re-
cover for such injury after birth. This case expressly overrules
the prior New York decision in Drobner v. Peters (discussed
supra). The opinion reviews the present state of the decisions,
and sums up the question thus:
"Shall we follow Drobner v. Peters, or shall we
bring the common law of this State, on this question,
into accord with justice? . . . We should make the law
conform to right."
A recent Minnesota decision added to those jurisdictions al-
lowing recovery. In Verkennes v. Corniea,'0 the personal repre-
'7208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E. (2d) 909 (1951).
....... Md . ...., 79 A (2d) 550 (1951).
....... App. Div ........ 102 N.E. (2d) 691 (1951).
...... Minn ........ 38 N.W. (2d) 838 (1949).
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sentative of an unborn child alleged to have been viable at the
time of its death through negligent injury, was held to have an
action under the wrongful death statute. The statute provided,
in effect, that when death is caused by a wrongful act or omis-
sion, the representative of decedent may maintain an action if
the decedent, had he lived, could have sued for injury from the
same act. In allowing the action, the Court endorses the holding
in the Bonbrest case.
Section 16 of Article I of the Constitution of Ohio requires
that:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law. .... "
In Willaims v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.'1 the Supreme
Court of Ohio held that injuries wrongfully inflicted upon an un-
born viable child are injuries done him in his person, within this
provision, and after birth he may maintain an action to recover
damages. The Court reasoned that to hold that a child has no
existence in law until birth would be depriving it of a right con-
ferred by the State Constitution, by the use of a fiction not
founded on fact and within common knowledge untrue and un-
justified. This Ohio decision was followed in 1950 by another
Ohio case, that of Jasinsky v. Potts.' This case is very similar to
the Verkennes case, in that it involved a wrongful death statute
substantially the same as that of Minnesota. The Court held that
under such statute, the administrator of a child who was injured
while en ventre sa mere, and died subsequently to birth, could
maintain an action for such wrongful death.
The California Code" provides that:
"A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be
deemed an existing person, so far as may be necessary
for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth."
In Scott v. McPheeters" this code provision was construed,
and the word interests held to include the right to maintain an
action for a tort committed upon a child before its birth. After
reviewing the problem, the Court decided that such interpreta-
tion was not based on a fiction, but upon the established and
recognized fact that an unborn viable child is a being separate
and distinct from its mother.
"152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. (2d) 334 (1949).
"153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E. (2d) 809 (1950).
"Civil Code of Cal. § 29.
"33 Cal. App. (2d) 629, 92 P(2d) 678, rehearing denied 33 Cal. App. (2d)
640, 93 P(2d) 562 (1939).
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NOTES AND COMMENT
The only Montana decision concerned with injury to an un-
born child is the case of Hosty v. Moulton Water Co." This case
has been cited in support of the proposition that recovery cannot
be had for the death of an unborn child, at the suit of the
mother." A careful reading of the opinion leaves considerable
doubt that this question was fully considered. The complaint
charged that, through negligence of the defendant, plaintiff was
so injured and mentally disturbed that, being pregnant, she lost
her child and became sick, and on that account suffered great
pain and injury. The defendant filed a general and special de-
murrer, the latter for uncertainty. The trial court sustained both
demurrers, and plaintiff did not amend. The trial court then
ordered judgment against the plaintiff "upon the merits" and
entered judgment dismissing the complaint. On appeal, the
Montana Supreme Court ruled that the special demurrer was
properly sustained, but did not pass upon the merits because of
the uncertainty of the complaint. The District Court judgment
was affirmed, but modified by striking the words "upon the
merits" from the judgment.
However, the Montana Code" contains a provision identical
to the California statute cited above, declaring an unborn child
to be an existing person, so far as necessary for its interests in the
event of its subsequent birth. This statute has never been con-
strued by the Montana Court. But in view of the present day
decisions on this problem, and the construction placed on the
identical provision by the California Court, it is likely that the
question will be decided in favor of recovery when it arises in
Montana. ROBERT BENSON
PERIODICAL ALIMONY OR SUPPORT DECREES AS
LIENS PER SE ON REALTY
This comment considers the effect in Montana of a properly
docketed decree for permanent periodic alimony or support pay-
ments automatically becoming a lien on real property of the
husband. Alimony payments in gross, temporary alimony pay-
ments, and decrees providing in themselves for the imposition of
a lien as security, are not included within this discussion.
The rule expressed in most states is that, although the court
may create a lien on the defendants' real estate as part of the
"39 Mont. 310, 102 P 568 (1909).
"10 A.L.R. (2d) Death § 2, p. 640.
'
7R.C.M. 1947, § 64-103.
14
Montana Law Review, Vol. 14 [1953], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol14/iss1/10
